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MEMORANDUM

Subject: Reconnaissance Phase of FIEND.

1. The following are random thoughts and/or data which may be of value in connection with the planning and execution of the reconnaissance phase of the Albanian operation presently written into the approved project.

2. Present Status.

(a) While the British have offered and we have accepted Malta as the base for our reconnaissance effort, utilization of that base is now restricted by the following British specifications:

(1) That for security reasons it will be impractical to utilize Malta beyond the approximate date of 30 October.

(2) That cover possibilities preclude the assignment to Malta of more than two American operatives, which operatives the British suggest be the operational deputy and interpreter, respectively. (Presumably, [] is already one of these two.)

(3) At this writing OPC has in hand none of the requisite tools for mounting the reconnaissance operation, namely, bodies, boats, aircraft, or communication facilities.

(4) Although the British have not responded to our question as to whether or not it will be possible to base sterilized aircraft on Malta, it is assumed that any agreement granted would be subject to the restriction on timing specified in (1) above.

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3. In view of the foregoing we cannot plan on Malta as the sole base for our reconnaissance operation. The time factor would, at best, allow the introduction onto Malta, for training and dispatch therefrom, of a maximum of ten Albanian agents; a separate base will be required for the preparation and dispatch of the remaining thirty agents envisioned for our reconnaissance effort. Furthermore, it may not be possible to dispatch the initial ten from Malta, if we continue with our plans for VHF communication by aircraft, unless we can provide the aircraft crew and the necessary communications equipment.

4. As to alternative reconnaissance bases:

(a) Utilization of either Italy or Greece would be conditional on cutting in the local services, which is politically undesirable at this stage.

(b) Utilization of Turkey or Turkish islands would require opening of a complete new set of negotiations and would therefore entail considerable delay. From a political standpoint a briefing of the Turkish services would present no grave problems.

(c) Possibility of the use of Cyrenaica is being reopened with the British and an affirmative answer may be expected within one week. However, it is quite clear that, should the British agree to Cyrenaica, their agreement would be conditioned by a restriction that base facilities could not be opened or pixies introduced until some date in the late fall, and, consequently, Cyrenaica would be of value only as the major training area for the latter phases of the Albanian operation.

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(d) No other British controlled area in the Mediterranean appears suitable as a base for reconnaissance operations.

(e) Either the American zone of Germany or Austria is a possibility, but use of either of these areas would mean infiltration of agents would have to be done by air. From an operational standpoint the long haul from either Austria or Germany, under difficult night navigational conditions, would be a risky and uncertain business.

(f) Trieste offers certain good possibilities which should be investigated. Use of Trieste would limit infiltration to the water route.

5. Initial steps to be taken to implement phase two (reconnaissance):

(a) Ascertainment from Abas Kupi and Said Kreziu the names and location of their nominees for the reconnaissance phase.

(b) The return to Italy, at the earliest practical moment, of Abas Kupi and Said Kreziu.

(c) Instructions to [] to be enrolled to establish contact with Abas Kupi, Said Kreziu, and Abas Ermani in connection with recruiting.

(d) Instructions to [] to arrange with the British for the contact and movement to Malta of ten Albanians, five each as picked by Said Kreziu and Abas Kupi.

(e) Preparation of a memorandum for ADPC for his approval of the purchase of not more than three aircraft to be utilized for the reconnaissance phase. As a basis for this memorandum the following must be first answered:

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- (1) Who the crew is going to be and how they are to be recruited.
 - (2) How the purchase is to be arranged.
 - (3) Where the aircraft is to be based and under what conditions.
- (f) Follow up to insure that the motorola equipment is secured by the first week in October and properly dispatched to the operational area.
- (g) Dispatch to the field an OPC representative who, in conjunction with [] , will:
- (1) Lay out arrangements for the use of the supplementary base.
 - (2) Lay out arrangements for the reception and basing of the operational aircraft.
 - (3) Work out detailed instructions for, and briefing of, the agent parties.
 - (4) Provide future detailed guidance for [] .

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